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howto:hardening [2012/01/11 08:19] – coolacid | howto:hardening [2014/07/25 02:29] (current) – Synchronet supports Digest auth now, you don't need to disable the server to disable Basic auth deuce | ||
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====== Hardening the Synchronet Servers ====== | ====== Hardening the Synchronet Servers ====== | ||
- | Hardening a system is the process in which an administrator or systems operator reduces the chance an attacker can either gain access or information from a system. | + | Hardening a system is the process in which an administrator or systems operator reduces the chance an attacker can either gain access or information from a system. |
===== Identifing your version of Synchronet ===== | ===== Identifing your version of Synchronet ===== | ||
- | Use of this document requires you to know which version of the software you are using. To identify what version | + | Use of this document requires you to know which version of the software you are using and ensuring you are using the most up-to-date |
- | On linux run: exec/sbbs - The version will be listed on the first line. | + | To identify what version of Synchro you are running: |
- | On Windows: | + | **Linux**: exec/sbbs -h |
+ | **Windows**: From the // | ||
+ | To check the latest available version of Synchro: [[http:// | ||
===== Why Harden My Server ===== | ===== Why Harden My Server ===== | ||
- | Atackers | + | An Attacker |
* Gathering information on the users of the system - this inclused your BBS users, not just you | * Gathering information on the users of the system - this inclused your BBS users, not just you | ||
* Using the system to attack other systems | * Using the system to attack other systems | ||
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===== Settings to Harden ===== | ===== Settings to Harden ===== | ||
+ | This guide will cover hardening synchronet from a security point of view, as well as an operational security point of view. Sometimes hardening breaks or removes functionality.. | ||
- | Some settings I'm proposing | + | * Linux/Unix systems: **DO NOT RUN Synchronet AS ROOT** |
- | * Displaying of passwords to the Console/ | + | *Create a username and group for synchronet |
- | * It is extreamlly | + | *Under the //[UNIX]// section, uncomment and change the following values. |
+ | // User=sbbsuser & Group=sbbsgroup// | ||
+ | *make sure you change // | ||
+ | | ||
+ | * Displaying of passwords to the Console/ | ||
+ | * It is extremely | ||
+ | |||
+ | // Note:// ensure the log/console is not accessible by untrusted users. Since passwords are stored in plain text, having them also in the log or on the console is not an increase in attack surface if this precaution is taken. | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Change the following option to **No**. | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Don't email passwords to users //They will be in plain text// | ||
+ | * Disable passwords being sent in emails //Plain text// | ||
+ | * Set the **email_passwords=** option to **false** in the //[login]// section of the // | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Hiding version information | ||
+ | * Providing version information to attackers in the form of a status or other messages will improve the chances of knowing what vulnerabilities the software may contain. | ||
+ | * Limit use of: **// | ||
+ | * NOTE: **// | ||
+ | * NOTE: Providing the Major Version number should be OK ie (Version 3) | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Preventing leaking of the internal IP address | ||
+ | * If your BBSs live behind some sort of firewall or NAT device, synchronet has the potential of leaking the internal IP address, ie (192.168.x.x or 10.x.x.x address). It is considered best practice to keep that information private as it will expose the internal IP address and details about the network it is connected too, hence the purpose of NAT from a security point of view. | ||
+ | * Limit use of: **// | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ==== Disable Plain Text Protocols ==== | ||
+ | //Note//: By hardening some of these functions below, you may also remove abilities of your BBS that can not be replaced by another secure function at this time. Specifically FTP & Finger. | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Blocking telnet and Enabling SSH. | ||
+ | * telnet is not a secure method of transferring information - at any given time it's possible telnet sessions could be intercepted (most dangerous during authentication) | ||
+ | * Ensure port 23 is filtered by the firewall. | ||
+ | |||
+ | * **Enabling SSH on Win32**: | ||
+ | * From the // | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | * Disable FTP | ||
+ | * FTP is not a secure method of transferring information - at any given time it's possible FTP sessions could be intercepted (most dangerous during authentication) | ||
+ | * **Disable FTP on Win32**: From the // | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Don't enable HTTP with basic auth | ||
+ | * HTTP with basic auth is not a secure method of transferring information - at any given time it's possible HTTP, with basic auth sessions, could be intercepted | ||
* Change: Configuration Value | * Change: Configuration Value | ||
- | | + | * In the .ini file, in the Web section, add (or modify) the Authorization line to read '' |
- | * email is not a secure method of transfering | + | * Ensure that any webctrl.ini files don't override this value. |
+ | |||
+ | | ||
+ | * NNTP is not a secure method of transferring | ||
* Change: Configuration Value | * Change: Configuration Value | ||
- | | + | |
- | * Providing version information to attackers in the form of status or other messages improves their chances of knowing what vulnerabilities the software may contain. It would be possible | + | |
- | * Limit use of: @VER@, @OS_VER@, @COMPILER@, @FULL_VER@, @REV@, @VER_NOTICE@ | + | * IRC is not a secure method |
- | * NOTE: @PLATFORM@ should be OK | + | * Change: Configuration Value |
- | * NOTE: Providing the Major Version number should be OK (Version 3) | + | |
- | * Don' | + | * Don' |
- | * Most times our BBSs are using an internal only IP address (192.168.x.x or 10.x.x.x address) | + | * Finger is not a secure method of transferring information - at any given time it's possible Finger sessions could be intercepted |
- | * Limit use of: @LOCAL-IP@ (Use @INETADDR@ or @HOSTNAME@ instead) | + | * Finger provides information about users, their current online status, |
+ | * Change: Configuration Value | ||
+ | |||
+ | * Mail Server Configuration | ||
+ | * If you plan to recieve mail on your BBS | ||
+ | * POP3 and SMTP | ||
+ | * If you only plan to send mail on your BBS | ||
+ | * SendMail | ||
+ | |||
+ | === Logging === | ||
+ | **Unix**: [[config: | ||
===== Hardening Suggestions for 3.16: ===== | ===== Hardening Suggestions for 3.16: ===== | ||
- | * Passwords should not be echo'd to the log/console | ||
- | * Set SCFG-> | ||
- | * Disable passwords being sent in emails | ||
- | * Set email_passwords=false in the [login] section of the ctrl/ | ||
* Disable Showing Version information to clients | * Disable Showing Version information to clients | ||
- | * text/ | + | * text/ |
Things to Investigate: | Things to Investigate: | ||
- | @NUMDIR@ - JS_VER - LIB LIBL - LN - MSG_LIB - SOCKET_LIB | + | //**@NUMDIR@**// - //**@JS_VER**// - //**@LIB LIBL**// - //**@LN**// - //**@MSG_LIB**// - //**@SOCKET_LIB**// |